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A B S T R A C T
Environmental taxes are often underexploited. This paper analyses the eﬀectiveness of a garbage tax, assessing
its eﬀects on multiple outcomes as well as its acceptability. We study how a Supreme Court decision, mandating
the Swiss Canton of Vaud to implement a tax on garbage, aﬀects garbage production and beliefs about the tax.
We adopt a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach exploiting that parts of Vaud already implemented a garbage tax
before the mandate. Pricing garbage by the bag (PGB) is highly eﬀective, reducing unsorted garbage by 40%,
increasing recycling of aluminium and organic waste, without causing negative spillovers on adjacent regions.
The eﬀects of PGB seem very persistent over time. Our assessment of PGB looks very favourable. It may surprise
that PGB is not implemented more often. Hence, we look at people's perceptions. We ﬁnd that people are very
concerned with PGB ex ante. Public opposition seems to be the main obstacle to PGB. However, implementing
PGB reduces concerns with eﬀectiveness and fairness substantially. After implementing PGB, people accept 70%
higher garbage taxes compared to before PGB. We argue that environmental taxes could be much more diﬀused,
if people had the chance to experience their functioning and correct their beliefs.
1. Introduction
Many countries aim to increase the fraction of garbage that is sorted
and recycled, and thus reduce the quantity sent to incineration or
landﬁlls. In some cases, ambitious recycling targets have been set. The
European Union, for instance, would like its households to recycle 65%
or more of their garbage, on average a 15% increase compared to
current levels (Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2016). Similarly, in Switzerland
household waste recycling targets at the Cantonal level can be at 60%
or more. One may expect these targets to translate into a wide use of
economic instruments to foster recycling. However, the use of theore-
tically ambitious economic instruments may not always be aligned with
the deﬁnition of ambitious policy goals.
From an economic perspective, waste management may not re-
present a pure public good. We stress in particular the rivalry in waste
management, since any additional bag of garbage or container gen-
erates additional costs to the community. Furthermore, it is possible to
attribute the costs of waste collection to the single household causing
them, for instance with the use of special bags (Fullerton and
Kinnaman, 1996). Pricing garbage by the bag allows attributing to
households their share of waste management costs, following the pol-
luter pays principle, well-known since Pigou (1920). Pricing garbage by
the bag may in principle also account for the external costs related with
waste disposal or incineration (cf. e.g. Muller et al., 2011).
In theory, the logic of pricing garbage by the bag (PGB) is com-
pelling. However, the real world seems either not to understand it or
not to accept it. PGB and other measures of waste taxation are not often
used in developed countries (see Halvorsen, 2012). In practice, there
are several reasons for the limited use of waste taxation. First, taxation
may not work for household waste. Consumers can ﬁnd other ways to
dispose of their bags, leaking them to areas that do not have pay-per-
bag policies, or consumers may not want to reduce waste production.
Taxation may also have a short-lived eﬀect on behaviour, with no long-
lasting impact on recycling. Second, people may think unit pricing is
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ineﬀective, or unfair, for instance due to its potentially regressive
nature (Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1996; Husaini et al., 2007).
We analyse the political economy of unit pricing and study both
eﬀectiveness and acceptance of pricing garbage by the bag. On July 4,
2011, the Supreme Court of Switzerland mandated all municipalities in
the Canton of Vaud, in Western Switzerland, to apply the polluter pays
principle to household waste by January 1, 2013. This ruling created a
quasi-experimental situation. Some municipalities had, already before
the mandate, implemented PGB and were unaﬀected; these are the
control municipalities. Other municipalities were forced to adopt PGB
to comply with the mandate; these are the treated municipalities. We
compare the evolution of outcomes in treated municipalities to control
municipalities, before and after 2013, to learn about the eﬀects of PGB.
Our approach couples four sources of information. First, we con-
ducted short telephone interviews with people living in treated and
control municipalities. To the same households, in both groups, we
asked twice the same questions, in fall 2012 and in spring 2013. We
asked questions related to the policy's eﬀectiveness: waste production
and recycling behaviour. We also integrated a module designed to as-
sess people's attitudes and beliefs about the policy. We were interested
in perceptions concerning the eﬀectiveness of the tax and its fairness.
The interviews provide a more complete description of behavioural
change at the microeconomic level and consumer sentiment. Second,
we collected administrative data on incinerated garbage, at the muni-
cipality level, from 2008 to 2015, to compare our survey-based esti-
mates of the eﬀects of PGB to administrative estimates. We also assess
whether the evolution of incinerated garbage is comparable across
treated and control communities, the key requirement for a diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences analysis, and analyse the persistence of the observed ef-
fects. Third, municipalities adopting PGB often facilitated waste dis-
posal to their citizens. We conducted a telephone survey with munici-
pality representatives and collected data on additional measures
undertaken by municipalities to assess to what extent PGB is a pure
price eﬀect as opposed to e.g. ease of access to waste management fa-
cilities. Fourth, we collected media data for the region, and citation
data for the largest city in the canton, and analyse the evidence avail-
able on illicit, or undesirable, behaviour.
Multiple outcomes need to be examined to determine the success, or
failure, of a policy such as PGB. Each of these outcomes follows from
hypotheses derived from the literature. We address the question of the
eﬀectiveness of PGB from diﬀerent angles and, in a single treatment,
provide the following empirical ﬁndings. First, our results indicate that
PGB strongly reduces the volume of incinerated waste. Both survey data
and administrative data indicate that the tax reduces the quantity of
incinerated garbage by about 40%. This result is consistent across
speciﬁcations regardless of how garbage is measured, i.e. in terms of
weight or volume. This is a ﬁnding per se, as it shows limited stomping.
Second, we show that PGB increases recycling of aluminium and or-
ganic waste. About 20% new households start sorting aluminium.
Similar results apply for organic waste. Third, we show that the eﬀect of
PGB is persistent over time. The 40% drop in garbage takes place within
a year from implementation, and lasts over the following years. Hence,
PGB seems to be eﬀective beyond the very short run. Fourth, we study
leakage by comparing Vaud municipalities, with PGB, to their neigh-
bours in Geneva, without PGB. A key concern with PGB is leakage,
people leaving their waste elsewhere to save on the garbage tax. We
ﬁnd no evidence of leakage. Fifth, we investigate the emergence of
other undesirable behaviours. We ﬁnd that a fraction of people keep
using the standard garbage bags, now outlawed. This fraction is,
however, very small and, with time, the incidence of this phenomenon
declines very rapidly. Citation data provide a similar ﬁgure. After a few
years, the level of undesirable behaviour is very similar to when there
was no PGB.
Our ﬁndings suggest that PGB is highly eﬀective in reducing in-
cinerated waste. Its eﬀects are neither driven by stomping, or leakage,
nor by short-lived increases in awareness of waste use and policies. To
ﬁnd a potential explanation for why PGB is rarely implemented, we
need to look at the political aspect of implementing PGB, and analyse
what inhabitants of the aﬀected communities believe regarding the
PGB's eﬀectiveness, fairness, and political acceptability. Our approach
provides the answer. Before PGB's implementation, inhabitants of
treated municipalities are concerned that PGB will not work, and be-
lieve the tax is unfair. Hence, we identify political opposition as the
main barrier to PGB. However, implementing PGB reverses the situa-
tion: inhabitants in treated villages believe PGB is more eﬀective and
fairer, eventually converging to the beliefs in non-treated munici-
palities, who had PGB throughout. To assess whether an improved
perception of PGB matters for policy, we asked people about the max-
imum price they would accept in a vote. This maximum price, the
garbage tax, is 70% higher after implementing PGB.
Our original approach contributes to two strands of literature. First,
our study complements the literature assessing the eﬀectiveness of unit
pricing. Several types of garbage taxation exist, such as pricing garbage
by the bag (or by tags, stickers), weight pricing, and subscription pro-
grams. Subscription programs tend to under-perform the other two
schemes, as the marginal cost of additional garbage may be zero if
households remain stuck with a given number of containers for which
they subscribed (Kinnaman and Fullerton, 2000). Ideally, unit pricing
should incentivise households to sort more, and to look for less volu-
minous wrapping while shopping (Jenkins et al., 2003).
Since the price of incinerating garbage, or disposing in landﬁlls, is
usually deﬁned in terms of weight, municipalities should in principle
price households in the same unit. When garbage is priced based on its
volume, and not weight, households may be tempted to compress waste
to reduce volume (the so-called Seattle Stomp). However, operating
weight programs is generally much more costly than operating volume
programs. It is hence an empirical question whether PGB can be ef-
fective both when measuring garbage in litres, and in kilograms.
According to the review of Kinnaman (2006), PGB and weight programs
may perform in a very similar way, in common units. Overall, the es-
timates for price elasticities that he reports range approximately from
−0.08 to −0.39, pointing to incinerated garbage as a relatively, but
not completely, inelastic good. This reconciles unit-pricing schemes
with other types of environmental taxes.
Second, our analysis contributes to the study of the acceptability of
environmental taxes. On the question of public acceptability, the lit-
erature is much less developed. Distributional issues are evaluated by
Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000), which estimate the income elasticity of
incinerated garbage between 0.05 and 0.57 (thus making unit pricing
regressive). Environmental taxes may be in general perceived as a
constraining instrument, for instance as opposed to subsidies (Steg
et al., 2006). A recent strand of literature on the acceptability of carbon
taxes emphasises how the incentive eﬀect of environmental taxes may
be misunderstood by the public and this may make Pigouvian taxes be
felt as ‘Ramsey’ taxes unless revenues are earmarked (see e.g.
Thalmann, 2004; Dresner et al., 2006; Kallbekken, 2011; Kallbekken
et al., 2011; Baranzini and Carattini, 2017). Yet, the cross-country
comparison of Husaini et al. (2007) suggests that, where implemented,
unit pricing enjoys a relative popularity among the general public. This
may be a signal that acceptability ex ante and ex post diﬀer.
Diﬀerences in acceptability are likely to occur if people tend to be
overly cautious ex ante, overweighting cons and underweighting pros,
of a policy change. There is one instance in particular, relevant to this
paper, in which acceptability has been examined over time, and has
been shown to increase shortly after implementation. In 2006 and
2013, respectively, the Swedish cities of Stockholm and Gothenburg
implemented a congestion charge for a trial period, followed by a re-
ferendum. In the city of Stockholm, voters decided to extend the policy
beyond the trial period. Resistance did not disappear with the trial run,
but was signiﬁcantly reduced (Schuitema et al., 2010). Hence, the trial
run contributed to permanentise the policy (Börjesson et al., 2012). In
Gothenburg, in 2014, 57% of voters rejected the congestion charge in a
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consultative, non-binding, referendum. Nevertheless, survey data show
that acceptability would have been 5% lower had voters expressed their
opinion before the trial (Hansla et al., 2017). Both commuters and non-
commuters were less skeptical towards the policy once in place
(Andersson and Nässén, 2016).1
Our study contributes to the existing literature on the eﬀectiveness
of PGB and the political economy of environmental taxes in at least
three ways. First, we study eﬀectiveness, and beliefs, in a setting that
forces municipalities to adopt PGB. This is a unique setting, allowing us
to document both what PGB does, and how it aﬀects people's percep-
tions. Earlier research is based on jurisdictions that voluntarily adopt
unit pricing (e.g. Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2004). The decision to imple-
ment PGB can be strongly correlated with the outcome variable, gar-
bage per capita. Nonetheless, we are aware of only a few studies dealing
with endogeneity in garbage taxation.
Second, our assessment is based on a transparent and plausible
empirical design. Our methodology consists in following the same set of
households, and municipalities, both before and after adoption of PGB,
allowing us to document our ﬁndings in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
setting. Our original data sources allow us to provide in a single
treatment a full assessment of PGB's eﬀectiveness, comparing evidence
from our household panel with administrative data covering a rela-
tively long period. We are able to identify the margin of response in
terms of frequency of recycling, the extent of stomping, the persistence
of the decrease in garbage per capita and the eﬀect on surrounding
municipalities. Thanks to the survey to municipalities we are also able
to provide a more complete description of administrative changes
around the implementation, and test (and rule out) whether the ob-
served eﬀect of PGB is driven by confounding policies. Thanks to the
length of our panel of municipal waste data, we can also test (and rule
out) whether the observed eﬀect of PGB is driven by short-lived in-
creases in awareness.
Third, and most importantly, our extensive information on people's
perceptions of the eﬀectiveness and political acceptability of the tax
enable us to assess how these beliefs change when the tax is im-
plemented. Doing so turns out to be important as perceptions change
dramatically when the tax is implemented. While the recent literature
on the acceptability of environmental taxes has used several meth-
odologies to understand why more often than not economic prescrip-
tions are not followed by local and national authorities, we are aware of
only another instance, namely the implementation of congestion
charges in Sweden, in which perceptions of the same households are
examined before and after the implementation of an environmental tax.
Our results on acceptability provide considerable implications. First, we
document that the main reason for not implementing PGB is people
thinking it is ineﬀective, or unfair, and not PGB being ineﬀective, or
unfair. Second, people update, and correct, their beliefs once the policy
is in place, suggesting that PGB, and potentially other environmental
policies, could be much more diﬀused had people the chance to observe
them in action. By studying a situation in which vested interest play
little role, we can isolate the eﬀect of experiencing environmental
policy on acceptability and inform the literature analysing more com-
plex policies, such as carbon taxes, in which popular opposition inter-
acts with lobbying from potential losers.
The next section provides information on waste collection in
Switzerland and a literature review. Section 3 provides background on
the data sources, and a ﬁrst descriptive overview. Section 4 presents our
empirical strategy, diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences, and discusses the identi-
fying assumptions. Section 5 provides our evaluation of the eﬀective-
ness of PGB. Section 6 shows how introducing PGB changes people's
perceptions. Section 7 concludes.
2. Waste Management in Switzerland and the Canton of Vaud
In Switzerland, municipalities manage waste disposal either directly
or by joining forces in regional companies that manage the full process
for several shareholder municipalities. Regional companies collect and
weigh garbage, which is then incinerated in local plants, also funded by
public capital from municipalities or the Canton. Regional companies
re-inject recycled materials in the production cycle.
Households are charged for this service by the municipality in
which they reside. Absent any pricing, all waste management costs are
raised independently of the quantity of garbage that the household
produces. Most commonly, waste management costs are covered by
lump-sum taxes calculated based on the number of household members
in adult age. Municipalities (as well as cantons and the federal gov-
ernment) can raise income taxes, but these are generally not used to pay
for waste management.
Households are free to recycle or not, based on the incentives that
they face. Drop-oﬀ centres are available in all densely populated areas
as well as in rural municipalities. Most of them allow the disposal of the
following materials: polyethylene terephthalate (PET), carton, paper,
clothes, glass, cans, organic waste, batteries, and aluminium. In many
apartment buildings, paper and carton are collected within the buil-
ding's premises.
In Switzerland, municipalities can set their own rules for garbage
collection, as long as they respect federal and cantonal law. Unit pricing
has existed for two decades in Switzerland, but in a very heterogeneous
fashion. Unit pricing is frequent in the Swiss-German, Eastern, parts of
Switzerland. In the Western parts of the country, it has been limited,
until very recently, to the Cantons of Fribourg and Neuchâtel (unit
pricing introduced in 2012) and to some municipalities of the Cantons
of Jura, Vaud and Valais. The cantons Jura and Geneva, are known to
have been historically averse to such policy.
Heterogeneity is the result of the principle of subsidiarity, according
to which municipalities have the right to decide their own way to deal
with waste management unless cantonal or federal laws prescribe
otherwise. A limit to the principle of subsidiarity comes however from a
1997 federal environmental protection legislation imposing the polluter
pays principle in waste collection management, thus forcing the im-
plementation of unit pricing at the municipal level.
In the Canton of Vaud, this legislation was nevertheless not enforced
until a 2011 lawsuit led to a Federal Supreme Court's ruling. The
Federal Supreme Court mandated all municipalities in the Canton of
Vaud to implement unit-pricing schemes to ﬁnance waste collection.
Lump-sum taxes are only allowed as a complementary source of rev-
enue. Since regulations for waste collection management are deﬁned at
the municipal level, this decision started a legislative process at the
municipal level that generated a large wave of unit pricing im-
plementations in the canton, driven by municipalities taking action to
comply with the Federal Supreme Court's ruling.
Our analysis focuses on municipalities that switched to a system of
pricing by the bag. Pricing for garbage is identical all across the canton
and proportional to volume, e.g. the price for 17-litre bag is 1 CHF or
about 1 USD, for a 35-litre bag it is 2 CHF, etc. When switching to PGB,
municipalities decreased the lump-sum taxes used to fund waste man-
agement costs, as prescribed by the federal institutions overseeing
regulated prices in the country.
3. Data
In this section, we ﬁrst discuss how we deﬁned treated and control
1 Note that, since the studies mentioned in this paragraph do not include a control
group, ‘the context in which the trial took place should be taken into account when in-
terpreting the results' (Schuitema et al., 2010, p. 108). Given that, in all studies, the
survey waves took place only a few months apart, there are good reasons to believe that
the role of confounders in driving these ﬁndings is limited. The role of confounders may
be more important in Murray and Rivers (2015), another interesting study that uses
multiple cross-sections, from opinion polls, to analyse the popularity of the British Co-
lumbia carbon tax. The popularity of the carbon tax increases persistently after 2011 in
both British Columbia and the rest of Canada. Sampling eﬀects aside, some of this result
may be due to an improvement in the Canadian economy after the economic crisis.
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municipalities, how we collected the household survey data, and pro-
vide a ﬁrst descriptive overview of the main variables.
3.1. Treatment and Control Municipalities
Before 2013, 86 municipalities had already introduced some form of
unit pricing, out of which 58 had implemented PGB. By November
2013, 162 municipalities had modiﬁed their laws in order to introduce
unit pricing by January 2013, out of which 158 adopted a PGB scheme.
A total of 121 municipalities had not reached a decision on introducing
PGB by January 2013.2
Our analysis focuses on municipalities that introduced PGB by January
1, 2013. We separate these municipalities in two groups. The 58 munici-
palities that introduced PGB before January 1, 2013, are ‘control’ munici-
palities, as they did not change PGB status. The 158 municipalities that
introduced PGB on January 1, 2013, are ‘treated’ municipalities.
We collected data on control and treated municipalities from three
sources: a household survey, municipality level data on waste, and muni-
cipality survey on waste management policies, introduced along with PGB.
We designed the household survey study as follows. We randomly
selected 48 municipalities from the set of control municipalities, and 22
municipalities from the treated municipalities. We then contacted a
professional survey company, which provided us with a random sample
of at most 30 addresses of people within each municipality in our
sample. Overall, we had 1380 addresses for the control group, and 599
for the treatment group.3
A team of interviewers then administered two rounds of telephone
interviews to households in our sample. The ﬁrst round of interviews
took place between November and December 2012. Due to the limited
amount of time available, we contacted only 70% of the households
before January 1, 2013, the date of the policy change. Since each in-
terviewer contacted a random mix of treated and control households,
households we did not contact are similar to households we contacted.
We collected data from 228 households in the control group, and for
124 households in the treatment group. The response rate in this ﬁrst
round of interviews is about 20% for both groups.
The second round of interviews took place between April and June
2013, once the policy was in place. Out of the 352 households that
participated in the ﬁrst round, 193 households participated also to the
second round. We will use data on the 193 households participating in
both interview rounds in our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analyses. The
response rate is higher for treated households. We discuss below po-
tential selection issues and how we pacify any related concern.
Interview data provide rich information on households, but do not
cover all individuals living in treated and control municipalities. To
address this, we also collected administrative data on incinerated
waste, available for all municipalities. These data provide information
on the quantity of solid waste produced per capita in a municipality. It
is available from 2008 to 2015. The data cover the entire Canton of
Vaud, allowing comparing survey data from our sample of households
with aggregate data for all municipalities in each group.
Many municipalities introduced measures that made it easier for their
citizens to dispose of their waste when they shifted to pricing garbage by the
bag. These measures have often been neglected in previous research, al-
though they may confound the main estimates. We collected detailed in-
formation on these measures. We contacted the member of the municipality
councils in charge of waste management for all municipalities covered by
the survey panel data. We administered a supplementary questionnaire
capturing changes in the number of kerbside programs, of collection cen-
tres, of skips, in the opening hours of existing collection centres and in the
frequency of raising-awareness initiatives taking place between the two
periods. Of the 82 municipalities for which we observe at least one
household, we obtained answers for 34 municipalities. We pay attention to
possible selectivity of this sub-sample of 34 municipalities in our estimates
below. Assessing the eﬀects of PGB only on the municipalities for which we
know that no additional measures were introduced between 2012 and 2013
would provide the same results as in the main estimations.
Furthermore, implementing PGB may increase household awareness
on the importance of recycling. Short-lived awareness may lead to large
estimates of PGB, which may disappear in the medium to long run.
Some households may also over- (or under-) react in the short run, and
realise that they may (not) be better oﬀ paying the fee than recycling a
given material. We use administrative data for 2014 and 2015 to shed
light on the persistence of PGB's eﬀect. This aspect has been generally
overlooked in the literature, and we exploit our relatively long panel
and the other properties of our context to ﬁll this gap.
Finally, implementing PGB may lead to undesirable eﬀects such as the
use of non-compliant bags. The largest municipality in the canton, the city
of Lausanne, keeps a record of the tons of improperly-disposed garbage that
it collects, as well as of the citations that it issues for illegal behaviour. We
use these data to have a sense of how important this issue is in this context
and how it evolves over time. We use media data from the global database
Factiva to check whether the trend, as well as the incidence, observed for
Lausanne may be a good proxy for the situation at the cantonal level.
3.2. Main Variables
The survey is structured in three parts. In the ﬁrst part, we ask house-
holds about their behaviour regarding solid waste and recycling of the
following 9 materials: PET, carton, paper, textiles, glass, cans, organic
waste, batteries, and aluminium. The second part of the questionnaire
concerns unit pricing's perception and acceptability. The ﬁnal questions
provide us with the standard socioeconomic variables (cf. Table A.2).
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the outcome variables
concerning unit pricing's eﬀectiveness: solid garbage per household and per
capita, recycling of the 9 materials and attention to voluminous wrapping
while shopping. Descriptive statistics are given for the treatment and control
groups for 2012 and 2013. Solid waste is measured in litres per week. This
value is obtained by multiplying the number of bags used per week with
their volume (17 and 35 l are the most common sizes). Total observations
for solid waste are 371. Recycling variables take value 1 if the household
sorts a given material and 0 otherwise.4
2 Among them, a few municipalities introduced PGB later during 2013, and are ex-
cluded from the econometric analysis. We further consider the possible implications of
this speciﬁc situation. Note that due to on-going merging processes, the number of mu-
nicipalities slightly diﬀers between 2012 and 2013. Note also that a few municipalities
implemented PGB in 2012, i.e. after the Supreme Court's ruling but before the formal date
of forced implementation. Excluding these municipalities from the control group would
not aﬀect our results.
3 The sampling rates are not the same across treated and control municipalities since
not all municipalities that were supposed to introduce PGB on January 1, 2013, did it.
Latecomers had not announced the implementation of the tax in November 2012, when
we designed the survey, but we could not rule out that some of these municipalities would
manage to introduce PGB on time. We exclude latecomers from our analysis as none
introduced PGB by January 2013. As shown by Table A.1, the municipalities im-
plementing PGB at a later stage are no diﬀerent from those implementing it on January 1,
2013, in terms of population size, greenness (measured in terms of votes cast for a green
party at the last federal elections) and income tax coeﬃcients, a standard proxy for
wealth. Data for 2014 conﬁrm this observation; the eﬀect of PGB is not diﬀerent on
latecomers. Section 5 tests whether heterogeneous treatment eﬀects may exist across
municipalities.
4 We do not measure the intensity of recycling but rather the probability of doing it.
Arguably we can assume that households stating that they recycle a given material do it in
most cases, even though probably not in all. Viscusi et al. (2011) describe recycling as a
dichotomous choice with corner solutions, i.e. people recycle or do not recycle at all. This
is the result of the following proposition: if for a given household it is desirable to recycle
n units of material, then it is likely to be desirable to recycle n+1 units. The choice of
frequency over intensity of recycling clearly simpliﬁes the task to interviewees, which are
not asked to estimate the share of a given material that is recycled. This estimation may
indeed be cognitively demanding and possibly lead to a substantial diﬀerence between
stated and reported behaviour (Sterner and Bartelings, 1999). We use a binary measure
also for voluminous wrapping: we ask to households whether they pay attention to
wrapping or not.
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4. Empirical Strategy
In this section, we explain the empirical strategy and discuss the
external validity of the household survey data.
4.1. Empirical Framework
Evaluating the introduction of PGB is challenging because adoption
of PGB could be related to environmental preferences of voters, i.e.
policy endogeneity (cf. Besley and Case, 2000). We describe in this
section how we address endogeneity. We assume the level of garbage
production absent any treatment to be dependent on time and muni-
cipality characteristics and apply a standard diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
approach. The parameter of interest captures the average eﬀect of in-
troducing PGB in municipalities that adopted PGB in compliance to the
Supreme Court mandate. The average eﬀect might vary across muni-
cipalities for socio-economic reasons, but not because of diﬀerences in
the garbage tax, as the tax is linear and homogeneous at the cantonal
level.
The key identifying assumption requires that the trend in the treated
outcome in municipalities that had PGB before the mandate, or control
municipalities, is the same as the trend in the non-treated outcome in
municipalities that adopted PGB in compliance with the mandate, or
treated municipalities.5
We now consider how this approach compares to those used in the
literature. In cross-sectional studies, as in Kinnaman and Fullerton
(2000), environmental-friendly communities may be relatively more
likely than others to introduce unit-pricing systems. Cross-sectional
comparisons may thus overestimate the policy's eﬀectiveness, since
these communities may generate lower amounts of garbage anyway, i.e.
regardless of the policy. On the other hand, communities with very high
levels of garbage per capita may consider implementing such policy to
converge towards a “standard” level of garbage production. Eﬃciency
reasons may also support this second source of endogeneity (Dijkgraaf
and Gradus, 2009). Cross-sectional comparisons may thus under-
estimate the policy's eﬀectiveness.6
Time-series analyses for the same community, as in Fullerton and
Kinnaman (1996), do not face this issue, but, absent any control group acting
as counterfactual, estimates may be biased by trends (i.e. simultaneity). This
bias may be very large if garbage is measured at diﬀerent moments of the
year, as seasonal variation may be considerable (cf. Sterner and Bartelings,
1999). Other elements, such as citizen's environmental friendliness, may also
change over time. Non-tax policies (as the ones we observe in our context)
may also aﬀect the amount of solid garbage produced by households. In
Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996), the authors collect data for other commu-
nities, regarded as similar, in an attempt to correct their estimates.
Our approach addresses both issues. For treated municipalities,
waste production changes over time because of the tax but also because
of other changes in time. Control municipalities provide information on
the time trend. Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences isolates the eﬀect of PGB by
netting out the time trend.
4.2. External Validity
Given its sample size, our survey may not be fully representative of the
Canton as a whole. In what follows, we thus discuss several pieces of evidence
to verify that our results are not distorted by selection issues. First, Tables A.2
and A.3, compare our sample to the population in the Canton. This com-
parison suggests that, if anything, our sample is slightly older and richer than
the underlying population, and includes slightly more Swiss nationals. These
minor diﬀerences may not be related with selection. Recall that we give equal
weight to all municipalities, regardless of their size.We thus cover households
living both in urban and rural areas. Second, Table A.2 compares individuals
who participate in the ﬁrst round of interviews but not in the second one, to
those who participate in both interviews. Results indicate that compliers may
be slightly richer and better educated. Statistically speaking, a small diﬀer-
ence can be found also for foreign (EU) citizens between the two waves.
Third, Table A.2 also compares individuals in the treated group and in the
control group. Once again we remark only very slight diﬀerences, for e.g.
nationality, education, and income. Based on these comparisons, we observe
that the extent of non-randomness, if any, is limited in the selection of our
panel. We will introduce control variables in our analyses to account for any
possible non-random selection.
Furthermore, we recall that we collected extensive oﬃcial data measured
by municipalities. Using these data, we can estimate the eﬀect of introducing
PGB using data on everyone in the municipality. To this end, we proceed as
follows. We ﬁrst compare population estimates with survey estimates to learn
about the representativity of our survey estimates. We then exploit the full
scope of the administrative data to look at all municipalities starting to price
garbage by the bag on January 1, 2013, as (extended) treatment group, with
all municipalities already pricing garbage by the bag by the end of 2012 as
(extended) control group. These tests should indicate whether our survey
results are also relevant for the larger population.
5. Eﬀects of PGB on Waste
In this section, we present the main results on the policy
Table 1
Household survey: solid waste, recycling and voluminous wrapping, mean comparison
between 2012 and 2013.
2012 2013
Variable Treatment Control Treatment Control
Per capita 27.385 16.187 13.875 13.153
Per household 65.906 39.728 33.647 35.061
N=85 N=103 N=85 N=98
PET 0.919 0.981 0.953 0.944
Carton 0.849 0.944 0.965 0.907
Paper 0.895 0.972 0.953 0.935
Textiles 0.872 0.897 0.907 0.841
Cans 0.733 0.925 0.756 0.738
Organic waste 0.698 0.85 0.884 0.841
Batteries 0.942 0.935 0.988 0.897
Aluminium 0.733 0.907 0.93 0.869
N=86 N=107 N=86 N=107
Attention to wrapping 0.471 0.551 0.571 0.608
N=85 N=107 N=84 N=102
5 Our assumption is somewhat diﬀerent from the standard identifying assumption in
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences contexts, asking for parallel trends in the outcome without
treatment in treated and control municipalities. The control group in our setting is always
treated whereas the control group is never treated in the standard setting. We assess this
identifying assumption below using several years of data before the policy change. If the
underlying assumptions are veriﬁed, an OLS estimate of our key empirical speciﬁcation
provides unbiased estimates of the average causal eﬀect of our treatment. In all survey
estimates, we allow for clustering of the errors at the municipality level. Household
characteristics may vary between municipalities and groups, so we will assess sensitivity
of our results to control variables. Note that readers can refer to an earlier version of this
paper for a detailed account of how the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach works and how
we apply it in this context (cf. Carattini et al., 2016).
6 Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) attempt to identify the direction of (and correct for)
this self-selection bias by estimating in a ﬁrst stage the endogenous likelihood of im-
plementing a unit-pricing system. Their ﬁnding suggests that the second source of bias
may dominate, i.e. simple cross-sectional analysis would underestimate the policy's ef-
fectiveness. Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2004) use the decision to adopt unit pricing as signal of
‘environmental activism’. Controlling for ‘environmental activism’, the authors ﬁnd with
panel data a lower estimate for unit pricing. They, hence, argue that this variable helps
correcting for the policy endogeneity. Based on their ﬁnding, they suggest that the ﬁrst
source seems to dominate, i.e. simple cross-sectional analysis would overestimate the
policy's eﬀectiveness. Allers and Hoeben (2010) use the tax rate of unit pricing in
neighbouring municipalities as instrument for the likelihood of implementing unit pri-
cing. This approach does not improve the estimates for unsorted waste, but it does for
organic waste.
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eﬀectiveness. We start by studying the evolution of waste over time in
treated and control municipalities. We then show eﬀects on waste, and
recycling, based on survey data. We then present evidence based on
administrative data, verifying the external validity and representativity
of our survey sample. Administrative yearly data are available since
2008, normalised by the number of inhabitants (i.e. kilograms per ca-
pita). We discuss how to test for leakage, waste wandering into adjacent
municipalities that have no PGB. Finally, we test the persistence of
PGB's eﬀect, using data for the most recent years, 2014 and 2015.
5.1. Parallel Trends
We ﬁrst want to understand the trends in incinerated waste, oﬃcial
data, produced by municipalities in the treatment and in the control
group. Fig. 1 shows average garbage in treated municipalities and
control municipalities who never changed their PGB status between
2008 and 2012. Dotted lines indicate conﬁdence intervals. We now
focus on the ex ante period. Both groups follow a horizontal path with
only a limited amount of variation around the steady line given by their
level of incinerated waste in 2008. This variation is marginal compared
with the large diﬀerence in solid waste production between the two
groups, which is narrowed only in 2013 when the treatment group is
subject to treatment.7 Hence, Fig. 1 provides evidence of convergence
between the treatment group and the control group, once the policy is
in place. We return to Fig. 1 when analysing the policy persistence.
5.2. Results for Garbage
We start by assessing the treatment eﬀect on the amount of solid
waste produced by households in the survey. The top panel of Fig. 2
shows the variation over time in the volume of solid waste per capita
per week in the treatment and control groups. The bottom panel zooms
on the diﬀerence and provides a ﬁrst approximation of the diﬀerence in
diﬀerences, which is of about −10 l and statistically signiﬁcant, as in-
dicated by the conﬁdence intervals.
Column (1) in Table 2 translates this eﬀect into numbers.8 We in-
troduce control variables in column (2). The treatment eﬀect amounts
to about −10.5 l per capita per week. By introducing control variables
in column (2), we test whether this eﬀect is robust to possible diﬀer-
ences in the groups' socioeconomic composition. Column (2) shows that
it is. The coeﬃcient for the treatment is indeed statistically unchanged.
However, several control variables are statistically signiﬁcant and the
goodness-of-ﬁt as measured by the within-R2 substantially improves.
We thus point to column (2) as the appropriate speciﬁcation and discuss
the estimates accordingly.
In 2012, the average solid waste volume per capita per week in the
treatment group was slightly above 27 l. This implies that the treatment
generates a decline in solid waste of about 40%. The eﬀect of Table 2 is
close to the estimate of Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996), a decrease in
volume of about 37%. However, the authors ﬁnd that in terms of weight
this estimate is signiﬁcantly smaller. We test below whether the mag-
nitude of PGB's eﬀect is the same when measuring garbage in kilo-
grams. In computing the price elasticity of demand we follow the
strategy outlined by Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) and ﬁnd an arc-
elasticity of about −0.3.9
Results on the control variables indicate that a high level of edu-
cation as measured by possessing a university degree is related to less
solid waste per week per capita (about 8 l) compared to having com-
pleted only the compulsory education (the reference case). It is indeed
common in the literature to have pro-environmental behaviour
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Fig. 2. Household survey: treatment eﬀect on solid waste per capita in litres per week.
7 We have tested parallel trends by implementing a placebo introduction of PGB for
treated municipalities in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012. The placebo eﬀects are all not
statistically signiﬁcant, and smaller than 10 % of the treatment eﬀect, in absolute value.
8 OLS is used in all speciﬁcations unless otherwise speciﬁed. Municipality-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects are justiﬁed by a χ2(2) of 32.08 (p> χ2(2)= 0.0000) in the Hausman test for
column (1) and a χ2(25) of 62.53 (p> χ2(25)= 0.0000) for column (2). Quantitatively
equivalent results can be obtained using household-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. We use clustered
standard errors (clusters per municipality) in all speciﬁcations where it is justiﬁed by the
standard heteroscedasticity tests such as modiﬁed Wald and Breusch-Pagan/Cook-
Weisberg tests.
9 On average bags are priced at 1.5 francs. Absent any tax, the retail price of a bag was
slightly above 0, around 0.17. The arc-elasticity resulting from an increase in price from
0.17 to 1.5 is the same as the point-elasticity at a price of 0.665. We hence obtain
−9.67 ⋅ 0.665 / ((27.4+ 13.875) / 2)=−0.32.
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positively associated with education (cf. e.g. Jenkins et al., 2003 for the
case of garbage). Income is available in six categories, with the highest
income serving as the reference. Consistent with consumer economics,
low-income households produce signiﬁcantly less garbage as they have
lower levels of consumption and lower opportunity costs of recycling.10
We ﬁnd a negative eﬀect for the number of adults in the household. The
literature points to economies of scale (cf. e.g. Sterner and Bartelings, 1999;
Halvorsen, 2012) and especially to a better allocation of recycling tasks
within large households, taking into account the diﬀerences in opportunity
costs. The statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for distance from a collecting
centre shows the importance of installing collection centres close to the ﬁnal
users reducing the households' cost of recycling. We relate this ﬁnding to the
vast literature on the eﬀectiveness of drop-oﬀ centres and kerbside recycling
programs (cf. e.g. Jenkins et al., 2003; Kinnaman, 2006; Halvorsen, 2008;
Hage et al., 2009).
5.3. Eﬀects on Recycling
We now investigate the eﬀects on recycling. Table 3 reproduces the
same approach of Table 2 for all recycling materials plus attention to
wrapping. The outcomes that we observe here are binary. We may thus
want to also estimate a probability model. Since the number of unknown
parameters increases with the number of households for a ﬁxed panel
length, such speciﬁcation would face the incidental parameters problem,
which implies that the coeﬃcients for municipality-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects
would be inconsistent. Applying a random-eﬀect model allowing for a
Chamberlain/Mundlak correction introducing the mean of time-varying
variables in the main speciﬁcation would help, but this would not be
possible absent time-varying independent variables. We can however esti-
mate a non-linear model by “brute force” (cf. Greene, 2011), knowing that
this technique introduces an upward bias of 100% when T=2 as in this
context, and compare it to linear regression. Since estimates from Logit are
very similar to those obtained with OLS, taking into account the brute-force
bias, and given the lost observations when success or failure are perfectly
predicted, we comment the empirical results based on estimates from OLS.
Estimations from Logit models are provided in Appendix A. For the same
reason, we do not display Logit models with control variables.11
In the top panel, we apply the simplest model without control
variables to the frequency of recycling. Treatment eﬀects have the ex-
pected sign and are the largest in the case of aluminium and organic
waste. In the bottom panel, we introduce our standard set of controls.
Only the treatment eﬀects for aluminium and organic waste are robust
to the inclusion of control variables. That is, the most conservative
estimates from columns (1) and (6) conﬁrm that there is an increase in
the frequency of recycling of organic waste (of about 14%) and of
aluminium (of about 20%). These eﬀects are not only statistically sig-
niﬁcant, but also considerably large from an economic perspective.
Regarding batteries, cans, carton, glass and paper, the coeﬃcients re-
main positive, but are no longer large enough to reach signiﬁcance.
Statistically signiﬁcant control variables include distance from the col-
lection centre and a few income categories. When signiﬁcant, the eﬀect of
income is in most cases as expected: low-income households have a lower
opportunity cost and are thus supposed to be more inclined to sort waste.
The eﬀect of distance from the collection centre is negative and statistically
signiﬁcant for all materials except for aluminium and batteries, which may
be less diﬃcult to transport than other materials. From Table A.4, we can
infer that a decrease in distance of about 10min would lead to an increase
in the frequency of recycling of paper of about 6%.
5.4. Testing for Confounders
Some municipalities facilitated recycling at the time of introducing
PGB. Neglecting these policies, we would tend to overstate the eﬀec-
tiveness of unit pricing. We now consider the role of this confound
using data from the survey to the municipalities. These data measure
whether a municipality increased opening hours, launched a raising-
awareness initiative, etc. or not.12 Table A.6 gives descriptive statistics
for the variables considered in this analysis for both the control and the
treatment groups. We observe in Table A.6 that non-tax measures in-
crease in both the treatment group and the control group, perhaps due
to the salience of the Supreme Court mandate in the entire region.
Estimates from the regressions including potential confounders are
presented in Table 4, using survey data. Non-tax variables are not available
for the whole sample. Column (1) estimates again the treatment eﬀect as in
the respective column of Table 2, but for the subset of households living in
municipalities for which we possess data on non-tax measures of waste
management. The treatment eﬀect is statistically unchanged with respect to
Table 2. Column (2) adds variables that indicate the presence of new
measures to facilitate recycling. The coeﬃcient for the treatment eﬀect is
somewhat smaller but statistically identical to the baseline eﬀect in column
(1). This result suggests that mainly PGB, and only to a much lesser extent
the recycling programs, explain the sizeable reduction in garbage in mu-
nicipalities that introduced PGB.13
Table 2
Household survey: treatment eﬀect on solid waste per capita in litres per week.
(1) (2)
PGB −10.51*** (1.921) −9.668*** (2.009)
Year 2013 −2.847** (1.184) −2.845** (1.360)
Gender (M) −2.192 (2.079)
Age −0.0904 (0.0783)
EU 4.012* (2.319)
Rest of the world −1.745 (4.424)
Adults in households −5.644*** (1.453)
Children in households −1.465 (1.023)
Apprenticeship −2.626 (2.515)
High school −2.275 (3.738)
University −8.055*** (2.496)
Jobless −1.462 (12.73)
Homemaker −11.32 (12.36)
Employee −8.208 (11.23)
Self-employed −6.783 (10.45)
Manager −8.632 (12.55)
Retiree −10.36 (11.60)
Green −0.159 (3.440)
Renter −2.110 (1.822)
Distance 0.268* (0.142)
Income category 1 −18.40*** (3.487)
Income category 2 −2.309 (3.972)
Income category 3 −5.919* (3.282)
Income category 4 −5.629 (3.868)
Income category 5 0.733 (3.956)
Income is missing −7.642** (3.242)
Constant 21.23*** (0.467) 56.12*** (12.70)
Within-R2 0.117 0.295
N 371 359
Note: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses (cluster per municipality).
* p<0.1.
** p<0.05.
*** p<0.01.
10 Note that socioeconomic variables may be given for the household's representative
answering the questionnaire, whereas waste management is rather a household decision.
11 All additional estimations are available by the authors upon request. The statistical
signiﬁcance of the treatment eﬀect on recycling, if any, is robust to the use of false dis-
covery rate q-values for multiple regressions (Anderson, 2008).
12 We exclude a few measures that aﬀected only a handful of households, i.e. aware-
ness-raising tools such as street stands and speciﬁc online websites.
13 We have replicated results also with administrative data on incinerated waste (see
below). Table A.7 shows results that are virtually identical to those obtained with survey
data. We have also explored how non-tax variables aﬀect recycling behaviour. Results are
not aﬀected. The coeﬃcient for organic waste, for instance, becomes 0.130, statistically
undistinguishable from the 0.144 of Table 2 and remains statistically signiﬁcant.
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Most non-tax variables are statistically insigniﬁcant and the good-
ness-of-ﬁt is only slightly aﬀected. The number of materials covered by
new skips is negative, and statistically signiﬁcant.14 The coeﬃcient for
the kerbside program is also negative, but does not reach signiﬁcance.
We also ﬁnd positive point estimates for better opening hours, new
collection centres (statistically signiﬁcant) and unaddressed mailshots
(very small). We suspect this result is driven by reverse causality. PGB
may also increase awareness in the short-term, regardless of the other
eﬀorts undertaken by municipalities. We analyse with administrative
data whether PGB's eﬀects change over time, as if they were driven by
short-term increases in awareness eventually vanishing away.
5.5. Administrative Data
To estimate the treatment eﬀect with administrative data, we look
ﬁrst at the amount of solid waste sent to incineration in 2012 and 2013,
focusing on the sub-sample of municipalities for which we also have
survey data. Estimates are provided in Table 5. The ﬁrst column shows
that the implementation of PGB causes a reduction in the amount of per
capita solid waste of about 86 kg per year. The goodness-of-ﬁt is much
higher than in the survey estimations, probably due to a lower varia-
bility in the (average) per capita waste production between munici-
palities than between households. In percentage, with respect to a
previous level without treatment of 244 kg, we ﬁnd a reduction of about
35%. Hence, the comparison of estimates from Tables 2 (in litres) and 5
(in kilograms) indicates that the two data provide comparable estimates
for the eﬀectiveness of PGB.
We obtain a very similar elasticity using weight as unit of mea-
surement (about −0.29 with the estimates from column (1)) as we did
based on volume. The slightly smaller elasticity may suggest the pre-
sence of some degree of stomping, yet not suﬃcient to lead to a sta-
tistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the main eﬀects. As noted by Bel and
Gradus (2016), such a diﬀerence is likely to exist mainly when volume
pricing is represented by containers, as in Fullerton and Kinnaman
(1996), instead of smaller units such as bags, as in this case. Con-
sidering for instance the case of The Netherlands, no diﬀerence between
weight and bag pricing is found in Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2004) and
Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2009), while some divergence is documented in
Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2015), favourable to weight programs, and
Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2016), favourable to bag programs.
Administrative data also allow us to test whether the treatment ef-
fect found so far applies only to the subset of municipalities covered by
the survey data or whether these are representative of the canton as a
whole. As a result, we reproduce in column (2) the same approach of
column (1) using all municipalities in the canton. Estimates from
Table 5 provide further evidence on the external validity of the previous
results. Based on 434 observations, 217 municipalities, the treatment
eﬀect is estimated in column (2) at about 80 kg per capita per year of
reduced solid waste. This ﬁgure is quantitatively undistinguishable
from the previous estimates and implies a reduction in garbage per
capita of about 40%. The treatment in column (2) is still PGB whereas
in (3) we take all unit pricing schemes as treatment. Introducing data
also on weight programs does not aﬀect the treatment eﬀect in any
statistically perceptible way. However, since only a small fraction of
Table 3
Household survey: treatment eﬀect on recycling and wrapping.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Aluminium Battery Cans Carton Textiles Glass Organic waste Paper PET Wrapping
OLS
PGB 0.235*** 0.0839 0.210** 0.154** 0.0910 0.0885* 0.195*** 0.0955* 0.0723 0.0497
(0.0718) (0.0519) (0.0877) (0.0652) (0.0683) (0.0443) (0.0695) (0.0528) (0.0475) (0.0914)
Year 2013 −0.0374 −0.0374 −0.187*** −0.0374 −0.0561 −0.0187 −0.00935 −0.0374 −0.0374 0.0558
(0.0401) (0.0403) (0.054) (0.0391) (0.0487) (0.0295) (0.0509) (0.0321) (0.0291) (0.0612)
Within-R2 0.047 0.009 0.037 0.026 0.006 0.017 0.032 0.012 0.008 0.008
N 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 378
OLS (with control variables)
PGB 0.195** 0.0288 0.149 0.107 0.0335 0.0206 0.144** 0.0361 0.00896 0.0561
(0.0745) (0.0511) (0.0940) (0.0656) (0.0766) (0.0355) (0.0645) (0.0531) (0.0412) (0.0987)
Year 2013 −0.00107 0.0192 −0.135** 0.00331 −0.00975 0.0281 0.0369 0.00225 0.00447 0.0577
(0.0423) (0.0373) (0.0587) (0.0360) (0.0542) (0.0180) (0.0470) (0.0228) (0.0183) (0.0682)
Within-R2 0.101 0.059 0.130 0.088 0.069 0.133 0.166 0.112 0.093 0.222
N 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 365
Note: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses (cluster per municipality).
* p<0.1.
** p<0.05.
*** p<0.01.
Table 4
Household survey: treatment eﬀect on solid waste per capita in litres per week, non-tax
waste management policies.
(1) (2)
PGB −12.20*** −11.08***
(3.129) (3.762)
Year 2013 −1.777 −2.692
(1.904) (3.299)
Additional skips: number of materials covered −1.340**
(0.606)
Collection centres: better opening hours 6.104
(4.170)
New kerbside program −9.383
(6.330)
New collection centre 6.918**
(2.690)
Awareness-raising campaign: unaddressed mailshot 0.647*
(4.462)
Constant 21.71*** 21.68***
(0.765) (0.748)
Within-R2 0.105 0.115
N 205 205
Note: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses (cluster per municipality).
* p<0.1.
** p<0.05.
*** p<0.01.
14 Note that this variable counts the number of materials covered by new skips, which
allows to avoid including correlated skip dummies for each material.
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municipalities opts for a weight-based treatment it is diﬃcult to infer
from this outcome that eﬀectiveness does not diﬀer across speciﬁc
pricing schemes.
A central concern with our analysis is the non-random nature of the
adoption of PGB. Most of the literature focuses on forerunners. Perhaps
treated municipalities, resisting unit based pricing until forced to do so, do
not care about the environment and recycling. This might lead to a very
large estimate of the eﬀects of PGB on garbage production because of the
speciﬁc initial conditions. We collect information on the votes cast at the
municipal level in favour of green political parties at the national election of
2011. Column (4) of Table 5 adds the green vote share and interacts it with
the treatment to assess selectivity of municipalities in our sample. The in-
teraction eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, sug-
gesting that the eﬀect of introducing PGB does not signiﬁcantly vary with
the green vote share. Nonetheless, introducing PGB reduces waste by 109 kg
per capita, somewhat stronger than the baseline eﬀect of 80 kg per capita.
But note that this main eﬀect refers to municipalities with a zero vote share
for green parties. In 2011, the average green vote share in the canton was
15.90%. Hence, the eﬀect of introducing PGB for the entire Canton of Vaud,
at the average green vote share, is −109.37+0.8556 * 15.90=−95.8.
This eﬀect is slightly stronger than the eﬀect in column (2), suggesting that,
if anything, our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences provides a lower bound for the
eﬀects of PGB for the entire region.
Dealing with possible confounders, we extend the speciﬁcation of
column (1) to control for other policies that could potentially drive
some of the eﬀect for the treatment, as done with survey data. We do
this in Table A.7. Since we possess data on non-tax policies only for
some of the municipalities concerned by the household survey, we
should compare the treatment eﬀect with or without these controls
based on the same sample. Hence, column (2) estimates the same
speciﬁcation as in column (1) on the restricted sample of municipalities
whose non-tax policy change is known. Even though the reduction in
the observations is non-negligible, the coeﬃcients of interests are sta-
tistically unchanged between columns (1) and (2). This additional es-
timation also points to relatively little heterogeneity in responses to
PGB. Similar to survey analyses, non-tax policies reduce the treatment
eﬀect, but neither to a statistically signiﬁcant nor to a quantitatively
important extent. One reason for this is that non-tax policies are not
only introduced by some treated municipalities, but also by some
control municipalities. A statistically equivalent estimate would be
obtained if estimating the eﬀect of PGB only on municipalities for
which we know that no other change occurred when PGB was im-
plemented.
5.6. Persistence
We look again at Fig. 1, which shows average garbage from ad-
ministrative data in the treated municipalities and control munici-
palities covered by our survey from 2008 to 2015. We now want to
assess the eﬀectiveness of PGB beyond the very short run. If the main
eﬀect of implementing PGB was to increase awareness for garbage use
and recycling, we should probably expect part of the eﬀects discussed
so far to vanish over time. Fig. 1 provides, however, evidence in favour
of PGB's persisting eﬀects. The average quantity of garbage per capita in
the treatment group seems to converge towards the average quantity in
the control group, and stabilise afterward.
Table A.8 reproduces the estimations of columns (1) and (2) of
Table 5 for this longer period. That is, we extend the standard estimations
to include data for 2014, and 2015. The estimates are statistically not
diﬀerent across tables (and, again, across speciﬁcations). The eﬀec-
tiveness of PGB is the same if measured within the ﬁrst year after the
treatment or within the ﬁrst three years. If anything, the point estimates
are slightly larger after three years.
PGB is eﬀective, and its eﬀectiveness is not related with possible
confounders, such as non-price policies. PGB increases recycling of
aluminium and organic waste, and its eﬀects are persistent over time.
The appraisal is so far very positive. However, at this stage we cannot
rule out the possibility of perverse eﬀects, for instance under the form
of leakage to neighbouring regions.
5.7. Eﬀect on Surrounding Municipalities
We assess whether there is scope for leakage by observing the
changes in solid waste per capita across the border between the Canton
of Geneva, where solid waste is not yet priced, and the bordering mu-
nicipalities of the Canton of Vaud, which implemented unit pricing on
January 1, 2013. The policy shock in the Canton of Vaud allows us to
exploit a sharp regression discontinuity design, where the threshold
between the municipalities in the Canton of Geneva (South) and those
in the Canton of Vaud (North) is given by the latitude 46° 17N. We thus
use the latitude as forcing variable, around the cut-oﬀ ° 17, and an
untreated control group. While from a purely theoretical perspective we
could be facing some mobility across the border, it is unlikely that
households can be tempted to relocate from one side to the other of the
border due to unit pricing. We select the optimal bandwidth following
Calonico et al. (2014).15
Our main focus is on the slope of the regression on both sides of the
border. If there was leakage, we would expect the amount of solid waste
per capita to increase (decrease) in the Canton of Geneva (Vaud) as we
approach the border from South (North). Fig. 3 provides the main
graphical results. Following the treatment there is a clear jump in solid
waste per capita per year, with a diﬀerence of slightly more than
100 kg. This result seems to corroborate the eﬀectiveness of pricing
garbage by the bag. However, this exercise also allows us to compare
the previous estimates of pricing garbage by the bag's eﬀectiveness with
a new set of estimates obtained with an untreated control group. In
terms of slope, there is no clear pattern.
Tables 6 and 7 provide quantitative evidence for the results sug-
gested by Fig. 3. The jump is estimated at about 107 kg per capita per
year, slightly above but statistically unchanged with respect to the
Table 5
Administrative data: treatment eﬀect on solid waste per capita in kilos per year.
Survey Volume +Weight Heterogeneous
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PGB −86.14*** −79.72*** −109.37**
(12.26) (4.386) (31.56)
PGB 0.8559*
⋅ Green votes (1.85)
Year 2013 −11.15** −9.084*** −8.461*** −11.15**
(4.346) (3.182) (2.748) (4.367)
Unit pricing −79.56***
(4.073)
Constant 173.6*** 186.6*** 181.3*** 172.2***
(2.380) (1.177) (1.116) (1.835)
Within-R2 0.715 0.828 0.822 0.834
N 116 434 470 114
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* p<0.1.
** p<0.05.
*** p<0.01.
15 We implement several bandwidth selectors as proposed in the literature and in all
cases the choice of the bandwidth has no implication for the ﬁndings of this section. Note
that Fig. 3 displays bins, and not single observations. Actually, not all available ob-
servations are used following the optimal bandwidth, as regression discontinuity design
focuses on local eﬀects in the region of the threshold. Estimating a diﬀerence-in-diﬀer-
ences approach across the border would lead to a treatment eﬀect of about −109 kg of
solid waste, statistically indistinguishable from the estimate of the regression dis-
continuity design. Data for Geneva come from OCSTAT (yearly garbage per capita in
kilograms).
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results in the previous paragraphs. In relative terms, the change is again
of about 40%, starting from a level for 2012 of about 273 kg per capita
per year. This ﬁgure is clearly consistent with the previous discussion.
While graphically there seemed to be some very small leakage, in sta-
tistical terms this evidence is not conﬁrmed (cf. Table 6). As shown by
Table 7 with simple linear local regressions, the coeﬃcient measuring
the slope of the regression is positive (negative) on the left (right) of the
threshold, but in both cases does not reach statistical signiﬁcance.
Hence, we conclude that there is no evidence of serious leakage (see
also the Swedish case of Sterner and Bartelings, 1999 and the Dutch
case of Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2004 for comparable ﬁndings).
5.8. Environmental Eﬀects
PGB increases the frequency of recycling and decreases the quantity
of garbage provided by households. It does not lead to much leakage to
adjacent municipalities. Its eﬀects should hence be beneﬁcial to the
environment. In principle, there are, however, two channels that may
make PGB less environmentally friendly than currently assessed. First,
one may be concerned that the decision of disposing versus sorting
garbage does not make any diﬀerence in terms of environmental im-
pacts. This could be the case if the environmental impact of garbage
disposal is limited, sorted materials are not re-injected in the produc-
tion cycle, or the recycling process is especially polluting. Second, one
may be concerned that people may change behaviour in an undesirable
way. Rather than sorting, they may dump their garbage in the woods,
use public bins, or refuse to use the priced bags. If illicit dumping is an
important component of PGB, PGB may do more harm than good to the
environment (Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1995). Hence, we include these
channels in our analysis.
In the context under study, unsorted garbage is incinerated. Muller
et al. (2011) measure for the United States the external damages from
solid waste incineration, which are mainly related with local pollutants,
and ﬁnd that these exceed manifold the sector's added value. Even in
Europe, waste incineration is associated with signiﬁcant emissions, in
particular of the following pollutants: PM10, NOX, SO2, volatile organic
compounds, CH4, CO, as well as CO2 (Eshet et al., 2006). Most damages
are associated to local pollutants, whose eﬀects are experienced by the
local population. Only 10% of garbage from the Canton of Vaud is
‘exported’ to other, adjacent, cantons for incineration, and even in this
case some areas of the Canton of Vaud are likely to be aﬀected by the
related emissions. All the materials analysed in this study (PET, carton,
paper, clothes, glass, cans, organic waste, batteries, and aluminium) are
collected and recycled in full. Other materials, such as plastic, are not
recycled. According to the authorities of the Canton of Vaud, for these
materials the life-cycle analysis is only slightly favourable to recycling
compared to incineration, once energy recovery is considered. Since the
Canton only recycles materials for which the life-cycle analysis is
clearly favourable, and since their analysis only considers energy con-
sumption and not external damages from pollution, we are conﬁdent
that, with full compliance, the eﬀect of PGB would be unambiguously
beneﬁcial to the environment.
We hence turn to compliance. It is hard to assess the intensity of
illicit behaviour. Conversations with local practitioners indicate that
the increase in the number of households involved in sorting organic
waste is associated with a decrease in the quality of the latter, with a
higher presence of “foreign bodies”. It is however suggested that these
practices are related with a lack of experience rather than an attempt to
cheat. A telling example is the use of non-organic bags for organic
waste. We, however, also have anecdotal evidence suggesting that other
types of behaviour have been undertaken in the treatment group, in
particular at the beginning of 2013, with the precise purpose of
avoiding the price on garbage.
Some of these behaviours are illicit, such as using unconventional,
non-priced bags. Oﬀenders can be ﬁned for such illicit behaviours.
Municipalities can search bags for any identifying information about
their owners. Fines are set at the municipal level. They usually range
from 250 to 500 CHF for the ﬁrst oﬀense, and can reach 1000 CHF in
case of re-oﬀense. Additional administrative costs, including for
searching, may exceed 200 CHF. Unfortunately, no database on ﬁnes is
maintained by the municipalities of the Canton of Vaud, and as such no
comprehensive analysis could be realised. One exception is represented
by the city of Lausanne, the capital and largest municipality in the
canton by population (about 140,000 inhabitants). Lausanne has been
tracking, since 2012, the incidence of illicit behaviour related to gar-
bage. Given that PGB implementation in Lausanne occurred on January
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Fig. 3. Administrative data: eﬀect on surrounding municipalities, regression dis-
continuity design.
Table 6
Administrative data: eﬀect on surrounding municipalities, sharp regression
discontinuity estimates using local polynomial regression.
(1)
Regression discontinuity estimate −106.7***
(37.60)
Total observations 11**
Observations (left) 5*
Observations (right) 6
Order local polynomial (p) 1
Order bias (q) 2
Available observations 28
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p<0.1.
** p<0.05.
*** p<0.01.
Table 7
Administrative data: eﬀect on surrounding municipalities: linear regression on both sides
of the cut-oﬀ.
Left of the cut-oﬀ Right of the cut-oﬀ
(1) (2)
Latitude 4.139*** −9.124**
(2.217) (30.48)
Constant −70.55* 50.12
(36.61) (573.4)
R2 0.402 0.013
N 5 6
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* p<0.1.
** p<0.05.
*** p<0.01.
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1, 2013, these data allow us to compare the situation in the city before
and after PGB.
Two measures obtained from the administrative records of the city
of Lausanne are used for this analysis. First, a measure indicating the
quantity of non-compliant garbage. Second, a measure of sanctioned
illegal behaviours such as littering, illicit dumping, and the use of non-
compliant bags (once PGB is in place). This second measure reports the
number of citations for these behaviours.
Fig. 4 displays the evolution of the ﬁrst measure. First of all, we
observe that even in 2012, before PGB was implemented, the quantity
of non-compliant garbage is strictly positive. The city of Lausanne uses
a kerbside collection scheme. Garbage abandoned in the wrong loca-
tion, or day, is collected by the municipality but counted as non-com-
pliant. About 50 tonnes of garbage are non-compliant. In 2012, the city
of Lausanne sent to incineration about 40,000 tonnes of garbage.
Hence, in 2012 improper disposal was responsible for about 0.1% of
this ﬁgure. While in absolute terms the value in Fig. 4 looks substantial,
in relative terms it seems rather negligible.
Starting from 2013, PGB introduces a new source of non-compliant
garbage: the use of non-compliant bags. Fig. 4 shows a clear increase in
the quantity of non-compliant garbage. Compared to 2012, this volume
more than doubles with PGB. In 2013, when PGB was implemented, the
city of Lausanne sent to incineration about 25,000 tons of garbage. In
relative terms, non-compliant garbage still accounted for less than 1%.
Hence, while the relative increase is substantial, its economic impact is
likely to be relatively small. Interestingly, Fig. 4 shows that after four
years of PGB, the situation is again relatively similar to 2012, before
PGB was implemented. Hence, cheating on bags seems to be a minor
issue in this context, even though we do observe a response in beha-
viour to the incentives provided by PGB.
Fig. 5 displays the evolution of our second measure, citations for
illicit behaviour. Illicit behaviour can take diﬀerent forms. It can relate
to littering, dumping, and illicit disposal (before and after PGB's im-
plementation), as well as the use of non-compliant bags (after PGB's
implementation). Fig. 5 shows the evolution of this phenomenon.
Consistent with Fig. 4, Fig. 5 shows the presence of some ﬁnes related
with illicit behaviour even prior to PGB's implementation. The number
of citations, however, spikes once PGB is implemented in 2013, with
more than 300 citations per year in 2013 and 2014. Once again, as time
goes by, the situation tends to converge towards the pre-PGB levels.
Most people probably abandon their illicit behaviour, given also the
escalation in ﬁnes with recidivism, while some may become more
skilful in avoiding being detected (see below).
Given the limited data available, this analysis is based on a single
municipality, although the largest in the canton. In what follows, we
test whether a similar pattern can be observed elsewhere. Some
municipalities in other cantons of Switzerland maintain for instance
some statistics on illicit behaviour related to PGB, which are reported
by the media. Two interesting stylized facts can be found in the media
coverage. First, in the medium to long run only a small proportion of
bags are unconventional. Cities such as Zurich, which implemented
PGB in the ‘90s, currently report a share of unconventional bags below
5%. Second, according to Zurich oﬃcials, in 10% or less of these bags
information about the oﬀender can be found. Hence, in the long run
people self-select into either legal or illegal behaviour. Illegal behaviour
is perpetrated purposefully by a tiny minority of households, which
specialise in this behaviour and invest a certain eﬀort to avoid being
caught. Given the importance of ﬁnes, the limited cost of priced bags,
and the infrequent occurrence of illegal behaviour, which we under-
stand implies a high probability of searching and enforcement, we have
two explanations for this equilibrium level of illegal behaviour: oﬀen-
ders either have a very low opportunity cost of time, or are not rational
when behaving in an illicit way. Note that virtually all illicit dumping
we came across in the media takes place in an urban environment.
Dumping garbage in the woods, which could cause very detrimental
environmental eﬀects, would imply an additional layer of eﬀort: of-
fenders should not only avoid leaving any trail, but should also make
the trip to the woods. At 2 CHF a bag, observing this behaviour would
be largely irrational, unless people are willing to store multiple bags at
the same time and are able to tackle the nuisance that they would
cause.
We hence conclude that, in the long run, compliance is reasonably
close to 100%, although not exactly 100%. However, adjustments may
be necessary to reach this long-run equilibrium. To analyse whether
illicit dumping may be more important in the short term, we rely again
on local media coverage. We recognize that the media tend to over-
weight uncommon behaviours, so our analysis does not pretend to
provide anything else than a perception of the problem through the
eyes of the media. We proceed by counting newspaper articles from the
main local outlets reporting on PGB. Fig. 6 plots the evolution of the
number of articles from newspapers in the Canton of Vaud, and sur-
roundings, covering ‘PGB’, and ‘PGB and ﬁnes'. Unsurprisingly, we see a
spike of articles on PGB in 2012 and 2013, right before and right after
the large wave of implementation that we study. Starting from 2015,
the local media gradually lose interest in PGB altogether.
Only a fraction of articles on PGB are concerned with ﬁnes. The same
pattern would be observed when using other keywords related with illicit
behaviour. In relative terms, most of the attention that the media give to
ﬁnes and illicit behaviour takes place in 2013. It seems that the frequency of
illicit behaviour is non-negligible right after implementation, with more
than 20 articles discussing ﬁnes in 2013. The interest in illicit behaviour
vanishes thereafter, possibly because most illicit behaviour vanishes. A non-Fig. 4. Evidence from Lausanne, the canton's capital: improper disposal.
Fig. 5. Evidence from Lausanne, the canton's capital: citations.
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systematic analysis of the content of some of these articles suggests that
municipalities have experienced temporary issues of diﬀerent sorts, in-
cluding in one instance an increase in the population of foxes, related with
the improper sorting of food waste. It seems that in most cases munici-
palities managed to ﬁnd the necessary adjustments, for instance by adding
video surveillance to collection centres and by resorting to awareness-
raising campaigns (pizza boxes should not include slices of pizza). As a
result, in many recent articles the overall appraisal of PGB in the media is
very positive.16 For comparison, Winslott-Hiselius et al. (2009) analyses
how the media covered the implementation of the Stockholm congestion
charge and ﬁnds that personal experience also changed the perspective of
the media vis-à-vis the policy.
In conclusion, there is little evidence of diﬀused and persistent il-
legal or undesirable practices in the context under observation, which
reconciles with the Swedish context of Sterner and Bartelings (1999).
If pricing garbage by the bag can be so eﬀective, it may be surprising that
we do not observe more municipalities implementing it. A possible ex-
planation might be that people do not know about how the tax works, or ﬁnd
it unfair. We analyse perceptions on eﬀectiveness and fairness in the next
section.
6. Eﬀects of PGB on Perceptions
In this section, we discuss the eﬀects of PGB on voter perceptions
and voting intentions.
6.1. Results on Perceptions
We address the questions of policy perceptions by applying the same
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach used with respect to the question of
eﬀectiveness.
We start our analysis with questions aiming to assess whether re-
spondents understand the tax. The variable perceived eﬀect on the environ-
mentmeasures whether respondents consider PGB ‘as eﬀective, in the sense
that it incentivises the inhabitants of your municipality to recycle more of
their garbage and pay more attention to voluminous wrapping’ accepting
answers ‘Yes', ‘No’, and ‘I don’t know’. Recall that we ask exactly the same
questions to both groups in both periods, before and after PGB is im-
plemented in the treated group. We study the proportion of people
answering ‘Yes' in columns (1) and (2) of Table 8. Socio-economic controls
are included in even columns. Since all variables in this paragraph are
binary, we compare again estimates from OLS regressions with a ﬁxed-ef-
fect Logit model estimated with Greene’s (2011) brute force method (cf.
Table A.10, even columns include the standard set of control variables). We
ﬁnd that the treatment is associated with more than one household over ten
changing its opinion in favour of PGB's eﬀectiveness.
Generally speaking, environmental taxes need in principle to be set so
that they internalise external costs. Remaining revenues should ideally be
spent on projects with the highest social return, or refunded to the public.
Voters, however, often ask for earmarked environmental taxes since they do
not see how improvements in environmental quality can be obtained
otherwise. We consider some unrelated municipal expenditures and test
understanding of environmental taxes using the variable use of revenues for
other purposes, which asks respondents ‘would you accept a pay-per-bag fee
whose revenues would be used to fund some public expenditures other than
waste management, such as education, safety?’.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 8 display a large and clearly signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient for the treatment. Again, no change aﬀects the control
group. As a result, we may infer that following the experience of unit
pricing, an important proportion of respondents becomes aware of the
incentive eﬀect of PGB. Looking at Table A.9, we observe that the ex
post mean of this variable in the treatment eﬀect attains the level of the
control group. The same applies for perceived eﬀectiveness.
In terms of fairness, we asked ‘In your opinion, is the pay-per-bag fee
unfair because you already pay enough taxes?’, an item that captures re-
sentment against introducing a new tax. A second item we study considers
responses to the question ‘In your opinion, does the pay-per-bag fee make
you pay even if you already sort your garbage?’. This item measures re-
sentments against paying a tax on the quantity of garbage that can no
longer be sorted. In both cases, we allow for ‘Yes', or ‘No’ answers.
Columns (5) to (8) of Table 8 report the estimates for both
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Fig. 6. Media data: local coverage of PGB and illicit behaviour.
Table 8
Household survey: policy perceptions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Eﬀ. env. Eﬀ. env. Use rev. Use rev.
PGB 0.165* 0.203** 0.421*** 0.458***
(0.0899) (0.0968) (0.0780) (0.0831)
Year 2013 −0.0251 −0.0268 0.0188 0.0155
(0.0602) (0.0633) (0.0519) (0.0566)
Socio-economic variables No Yes No Yes
Within-R2 0.013 0.119 0.116 0.214
N 385 368 383 365
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Unfair taxes Unfair taxes Unfair sort Unfair sort
PGB −0.160* −0.208** −0.253*** −0.312***
(0.0801) (0.0838) (0.0910) (0.0977)
Year 2013 −0.0376 −0.00346 0.0439 0.0925
(0.0486) (0.0530) (0.0583) (0.0658)
Socio-economic variables No Yes No Yes
Within-R2 0.028 0.181 0.026 0.142
N 385 368 385 368
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Unfair ineq. Unfair ineq. Leg. cush. Leg. cush.
PGB −0.0186 −0.0375 −0.0671 −0.00935
(0.0749) (0.0780) (0.0896) (0.0937)
Year 2013 −0.144*** −0.118*** 0.273*** 0.248***
(0.0413) (0.0440) (0.0557) (0.0597)
Socio-economic variables No Yes No Yes
Within-R2 0.057 0.114 0.070 0.181
N 385 368 383 365
Note: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses (cluster per municipality).
* p<0.1.
** p<0.05.
*** p<0.01.
16 We consider the following newspapers, all tracked via Factiva: Le Temps, 24 Heures,
La Côte, Le Matin and Le Matin Dimanche. For 2017, we consider only the ﬁrst 6 months. In
Fig. 6, we consider the keywords ‘PGB’ (taxe au sac in French), ‘ﬁnes' (amendes), and the
logical operator ‘and’. In other analyses, not included in Fig. 6, we replace ‘ﬁnes' with
‘oﬀenders' (contravenants), ‘illegal bags' (sacs illégaux), and ‘illicit dumping’ (dépôts d’or-
dures sauvages, dépôts non conformes, déchets sauvages, déchetteries sauvages).
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unfairness items. Introducing PGB reduces the feeling of unfairness of
having one more tax, and of having to pay a tax on unsorted garbage.
Implementing PGB reduces both resentments, as people possibly un-
derstand the mechanism behind unit pricing better.
We also explore the feeling of inequity, since PGB opposes two diﬀerent
concepts of justice, the polluter pays principle, advocating for higher ﬁscal
burden for bigger polluters, and a social equity principle, stating that the
ﬁscal burden should depend at least proportionally on one's contributive
capacity. Given the regressive nature of PGB, the two concepts conﬂict. The
income elasticity of garbage is 0.4 in our sample, so pricing garbage by the
bag has indeed a regressive eﬀect. The ﬁrst item we study is ‘In your opi-
nion, a pay-per-bag fee favours high-income households and is thus in-
equitable’, allowing for ‘Yes' and ‘No’ answers. This variable captures re-
sentments against the regressive nature of the tax. The second variable
stated ‘The pay-per-bag fee could imply a higher expenditure for low-in-
come households'. Respondents were given a choice between three answers:
(1) ‘I think this is legitimate’, (2) ‘I think that the fee is legitimate provided
that low-income households are compensated’, or (3) ‘This fact does not
inﬂuence your opinion on the pay-per-bag fee’. We analyse the proportion
of (2) answers.
Columns (9) and (10) of Table 8 present the estimates for the per-
ception of inequitable treatment, while columns (11) and (12) display
the estimates for social justice. Introducing PGB does not aﬀect per-
ception of whether the tax is inequitable or legitimate. The point esti-
mates on the treatment eﬀect are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
But both treatment and control groups consider PGB less inequitable
after January 1, 2013, possibly because this large wave of im-
plementations made individuals much more aware of the regressive
impacts that alternative sources of revenues for waste management may
have. The public debate also highlighted the measures undertaken by
municipalities to oﬀset possible distributional eﬀects.
Experiencing the treatment seems to positively aﬀect PGB's per-
ception, in particular concerning its eﬀectiveness and the related sen-
timents of unfairness. Seeing the tax work, in one's own household as
well as in one's social environment, may change some erroneous beliefs
that it is not eﬀective. The stigma of social injustice associated to unit
pricing is smoothed in the whole canton, according to the evidence in
our sample, perhaps because the large media coverage at the local level
contributed to make clear that policy-induced distributional eﬀects are
not an inevitable condition of unit pricing.
6.2. Voting Intentions
Individuals become less averse to PGB once they are forced to live with
it. In what follows, we assess the implications of this change in perception
on the chances of PGB to survive in the political arena. We discuss this using
data on voting intentions on the bag's maximum price.
We asked respondents about the maximum bag's price they would
vote for in a ballot, if asked to deﬁne the tax rate for PGB. Speciﬁcally,
respondents were asked ‘if you were asked to vote on the fee's rate,
what is the highest price you would accept to pay for a 35-litre bag?’We
accepted responses between 0 and 5 CHF, at increments of 50 cents.
Note that this scenario is very realistic as Swiss people regularly vote on
local, regional, and national issues.
This survey instrument measures political acceptability of the tax.
Note that this is diﬀerent from willingness to pay. A rich individual,
with high willingness to pay to get rid of garbage without time-con-
suming sorting activities, may well indicate a politically acceptable
price of zero in our survey.
Fig. 7 shows the distribution of acceptable prices for 2012 and 2013.
For both years and groups the distribution is not normal and clusters at 0
and 2 (the oﬃcial price for a 35 -litre bag). In the treated group, 59 % of
individuals indicated an acceptable price of zero, as opposed to 38 % in the
control group, before the implementation of PGB. There is a striking dif-
ference in the average acceptable price as well. Treated municipalities are
willing to vote for a price of 0.89 CHF, whereas control municipalities
would vote for 1.49 CHF, or 67 % higher than in the not-yet treated group.
In 2013, after PGB has been introduced in treated municipalities,
the distributions of acceptable prices overlap. Interestingly, the modal
answer in both groups of municipalities is 2 CHF, the actual price of a
garbage bag. Hence, it is plausible that the current price provides a
reference for voting behaviour. The average acceptable price in the
treatment group is 1.55 CHF, and 1.57 CHF in the control group. That
is, people increase by 70% the stated maximum price per garbage bag
that they would approve in a ballot. Introducing PGB has removed any
diﬀerences in the acceptability of the garbage tax.
7. Conclusion
We address the question of unit-pricing programs' eﬀectiveness. We
provide causal estimates of pricing garbage by the bag's eﬀect on the
amount of solid waste incinerated in the Canton of Vaud, Switzerland.
The identiﬁcation strategy relies on the forced implementation on
January 1, 2013, of pricing garbage by the bag in many municipalities
of the Canton of Vaud, due to a ruling decision by the Federal Supreme
Court of Switzerland, creating a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences situation.
Both survey and administrative data show that pricing garbage by the
bag causes a reduction in the amount of incinerated garbage per capita by
about 40%, implying a price elasticity of demand of about −0.3. Lower
incinerated garbage is accompanied by a higher frequency of recycling of
e.g. organic waste and aluminium. Our estimates are robust to the presence
of simultaneous introduction of other measures that make garbage collec-
tion easier. The eﬀects of pricing garbage by the bag are also persistent.
Pricing garbage by the bag's eﬀectiveness is the same within one year or
three years from the implementation. Applying a regression-discontinuity
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Fig. 7. Household survey: voting intentions, histogram.
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design, we rule out the potential risk of substantial leakage eﬀects on sur-
rounding municipalities. The incidence of other undesirable behaviours is
also relatively small, and decays rapidly over time.
We also analyse people's beliefs concerning pricing garbage by the
bag's eﬀectiveness and fairness. Our key result is a sizable gap between
ex ante beliefs and ex post beliefs. People initially believe the tax is
unfair and does not work, but implementing it improves the program's
perception of eﬀectiveness and fairness. The environmental tax seems
to be better understood once in place.
Biased beliefs can be an obstacle to implementing economic po-
licies. People are pessimistic about an environmental tax before they
experience it, and become more optimistic once the tax has been im-
plemented. If people hold pessimistic beliefs at the time of democratic
decision-making, many environmental policies will not be im-
plemented. Our setting shows a way out of this stalemate. Outside
force, e.g. the Supreme Court mandate, can force people to experience a
new economic instrument, thereby updating beliefs, as in the context
that we have analysed.
Our context does not allow municipalities to revert the changes
forced unto them, but in an ideal world, people could decide on keeping
the new policy or returning to the status quo after testing it. Policies
forced onto people that remain detested could be abandoned after the
trial period. Policies that people embrace after living with them would
remain. A mechanism dealing with incorrect beliefs would force people
to implement a new environmental tax temporarily but allow them to
keep it or abandon it after a trial period. A ﬁrst example of this me-
chanism can be found in the referendums held in Sweden, in the cities
of Stockholm and Gothenburgh, on the local congestion charges, after
the policy had been experienced by local commuters, and citizens had
the chance to revise their beliefs accordingly (Schuitema et al., 2010;
Börjesson et al., 2012; Andersson and Nässén, 2016; Hansla et al.,
2017). Mandatory trial runs may force calculating policy-makers to give
a chance also to policies considered as unpopular, and push skeptical
members of the general public to try them.
Appendix A. Appendix Tables
Table A.1
Administrative data: comparison between villages implementing PGB on schedule, and ‘latecomers'.
PGB from January 1, 2013 PGB from later in 2013, 2014
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N
Population 2509.27 10,564.87 161 2435.34 4659.38 70
Income tax coeﬃcient 69.29 8.33 161 69.38 7.71 70
Green vote share 16.46 4.00 161 16.88 4.34 70
p-Value for two-sided t-test
< 0 ≠0 >0
Population 0.5294 0.9412 0.4706
Income tax coeﬃcient 0.4676 0.9352 0.5324
Green vote share 0.2454 0.4907 0.7546
Note: No diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at 10%. Population is the resident population in the municipality as of 2012. The income tax coeﬃcient measures the tax paid to the
municipality, as a fraction of the tax paid to the canton. Wealthy municipalities tend to have a low income tax coeﬃcient. Green vote share is the proportion of the electorate voting for a
green party (either the Green Party of Switzerland or the Green Liberal Party of Switzerland) at the last federal elections.
Table A.2
Household survey: sample's socioeconomic characteristics.
Interviewed only in 2012 Panel
Treatment group Control group Treatment group Control group
Gender (M) 0.41 0.331 0.43 0.327
Age 54.615 58.392 56.395 56.093
Switzerland 0.821 0.842 0.791 0.879
European Union 0.154 0.133 0.186 0.075*
Rest of the world 0.026 0.025 0.023 0.047
Adults in households 2.103 2.042 1.942* 2.131
Children in households 0.974 0.587 0.674* 0.71
Households 38 121 86 107
Total households 159 193
Compulsory schooling 0.135 0.153 0.070 0.190
Apprenticeship 0.405 0.369 0.477 0.343
High school 0.135 0.234 0.104 0.143**
University 0.324 0.243 0.349 0.324*
Jobless 0.026 0.008 0.023 0
Student 0 0 0 0
Homemaker 0.079 0.084 0.058 0.066
Employee 0.447 0.303 0.384 0.34
Self-employed 0.184 0.151 0.151 0.094*
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International civil servant 0 0 0 0
Manager 0 0.042 0.047* 0.075
Retired 0.237 0.403 0.337 0.387
Income category 1 (< 3000 CHF) 0.026 0.041 0.058 0.075
Income category 2 (3001–5000 CHF) 0.051 0.165 0.093 0.168
Income category 3 (5001–7000 CHF) 0.103 0.124 0.198* 0.121
Income category 4 (7001–9000 CHF) 0.077 0.107 0.163* 0.037**
Income cateory 5 (9001–15,000 CHF) 0.051 0.041 0.105 0.112*
Income category 6 (> 15,001 CHF) 0.051 0.033 0.081 0.065
Distance from collecting centre (in minutes) 7.836 5.784 6.368 4.918*
Green 0.135 0 0.093 0
Households 37 116 85 103
Total households 153 188
Note: *, ** and *** imply statistically-signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the mean for the same group between samples at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. No missing values aﬀect the ﬁrst block of
variables (from gender to children in the household). Income is measured as household monthly gross income in Swiss francs (CHF). We also obtain a measure of distance from the closest
collecting centre (in kilometres and in minutes with the appropriate transport mode) from respondents, which is, however, not available in the oﬃcial statistics. To avoid excessive
missing values, we impute distance in time from distance in space whenever needed and use the former as variable. We qualify as “green” the members of environmental organizations. A
measure of general trust, as used by the World Values Survey and other large surveys (cf. e.g. Glaeser et al., 2000), is included only in the survey of 2013 and does not allow for
comparison between samples. The same applies to the proportion of renters (versus homeowners). Trust is 0.5 in the treatment group and 0.42 in the control group. Renters are 0.34 in the
treatment group and 0.33 in the control group.
Table A.3
Administrative data: Canton of Vaud's socioeconomic characteristics.
Cantonal mean
Gender (M) 0.489
Age< 20 0.222
Age 20-39 0.276
Age 40-64 0.340
Age> 65 0.162
Switzerland 0.682
European Union (EU) 0.230
Rest of the world 0.088
Adults 0.776
Children 0.224
Single-adult households 0.386
Households without children 0.247
Households with children 0.277
Single-member households 0.063
Household size 2.2
Compulsory schooling 0.268
Apprenticeship 0.300
High school 0.091
University 0.321
Jobless 0.049
Student 0.080
Homemaker 0.127
Employee 0.480
Manager 0.065
Retired 0.094
Income<35,000 CHF 0.192
Income 35,001–60,000 CHF 0.220
Income 60,001–80,000 CHF 0.160
Income 80,001–100,000 CHF 0.114
Income 100,001–175,000 CHF 0.207
Income>175,001 CHF 0.107
Renters 0.694
Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce and Statistique Vaud.
Note: Cantonal statistics refer to years 2012 or 2013 whenever data are available, to year 2011 otherwise. Cantonal data deﬁne as
children individuals from age 0 to 19. Educational achievements are given only for population over 30 years. The level of education of 2%
of the canton is not known. The share of self-employed workers is not given. Income is measured as yearly gross income in Swiss francs
(CHF). The proportion of renters is obtained from the negative of the share of housing assets with owners living in. No measure for trust is
available at the cantonal level. The World Values Survey wave of 2007 reports a level of trust of 0.539 for Switzerland. More recent data
are available from the European Social Survey, which, however, uses a 10 points scale instead of a binary variable as in our survey.
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Table A.5
Household survey: treatment eﬀect on recycling and wrapping, Logit.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Aluminium Battery Cans Carton Textiles Glass Organic waste Paper PET Wrapping
OLS
PGB 0.264*** 0.209*** 0.293*** 0.207*** 0.116 0.200*** 0.232*** 0.191** 0.177** 0.0692*
(0.0576) (0.0493) (0.0733) (0.0468) (0.0710) (0.0653) (0.0724) (0.0762) (0.0879) (0.0757)
Year 2013 −0.0683 −0.0857 −0.346 −0.0773 −0.0812 −0.0606 −0.0174 −0.126 −0.146 0.0582
(0.0736) (0.0940) (0.0999) (0.0810) (0.0689) (0.0962) (0.0944) (0.107) (0.113) (0.110)
Pseudo-R2 0.119 0.079 0.131 0.096 0.056 0.096 0.097 0.064 0.072 0.084
N 234 120 282 184 250 112 246 144 136 343
Note: Marginal eﬀects are reported for Logit (all discrete changes). Brute force ﬁxed eﬀects.
Individuals bypassed if Y ict always =0 or always =1 (ﬁxed eﬀects cannot be computed).
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses (cluster per municipality).
* p<0.1.
** p<0.05.
*** p<0.01.
Table A.6
Municipality survey: non-tax waste management policies undertaken between 2012 and 2013, descriptive statistics.
Treatment group Control group
Variable Mean
Did the municipality introduce a new kerbside program 0.074 0.034
Did the municipality introduce a new collection centre 0.064 0.043
Did the municipality extend the opening hours of its centres 0.223 0.155
Did the municipality add a new skip for
Paper 0.117 0.043
Carton 0.064 0.06
PET 0.17 0.043
Textiles 0.117 0.06
Glass 0.17 0.043
Cans 0.117 0.043
Batteries 0.117 0.043
Aluminium 0.064 0.043
Plastic 0.085 0
Wood 0 0.017
Organic waste 0.117 0.138
Overall number of materials covered by the new skips 1.138 0.534
Did the municipality implement any awareness-raising initiative
Unaddressed mailshot 0.5 0.345
Information session 0.117 0
Street stand 0.021 0
Speciﬁc websites 0 0.017
N 94 116
Table A.7
Administrative data: treatment eﬀect on solid waste per capita in kilos per year, non-tax waste management policies.
(1) (2) (3)
PGB −86.14*** −84.80*** −82.73***
(12.26) (16.25) (19.86)
Year 2013 −11.15** −7.579** −6.619
(4.346) (3.407) (7.496)
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Additional skips: number of materials covered −0.110
(2.669)
Collection centres: better opening hours −16.00
(13.81)
New kerbside program 17.04
(14.27)
New collection centre 12.49*
(6.282)
Awareness-raising campaign: unaddressed mailshot 1.356
(10.01)
Constant 173.6*** 178.7*** 178.7***
(2.380) (3.012) (3.062)
Within-R2 0.715 0.724 0.737
N 116 68 68
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* p<0.1.
** p<0.05.
*** p<0.01.
Table A.8
Administrative data: treatment eﬀect on solid waste per capita in kilos per year, 2012–2015.
Survey Volume
(1) (2)
PGB −90.47*** −80.82***
(8.942) (4.226)
Constant 173.6*** 186.9***
(2.946) (1.591)
Within-R2 0.674** 0.792*
N 232 867
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Time dummies for 2013, 2014 and 2015 included in the estimation.
* p<0.1.
** p<0.05.
*** p<0.01.
Table A.9
Household survey: policy perceptions, mean comparison between 2012 and 2013.
2012 2013
Treatment group Control group Treatment group Control group
Variable Short Mean Mean Mean Mean
Perceived eﬀectiveness on own behaviour Eﬀ. own 0.419 0.411 0.547 0.383
N=86 N=107 N=86 N=107
Perceived eﬀectiveness Eﬀectiveness 0.784 0.839 0.928 0.878
N=74 N=93 N=69 N=90
Perceived eﬀect on the environment Eﬀ. env. 0.581 0.736 0.721 0.71
Use of revenues for other purposes Use rev. 0.262 0.689 0.709 0.71
Unfair: inequitable Unfair ineq. 0.233 0.208 0.07 0.065
Unfair: paying enough taxes Unfair taxes 0.547 0.302 0.349 0.262
Unfair: paying even if sorting Unfair sort 0.558 0.34 0.349 0.383
N=86 N=106 N=86 N=107
Legitimacy provided social cushioning Leg. cush. 0.353 0.286 0.558 0.561
N=85 N=105 N=86 N=107
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Table A.10
Household survey: policy perceptions, Logit.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Eﬀ. env. Eﬀ. env. Use rev. Use rev.
PGB 0.174* 0.220** 0.439*** 0.499***
(0.0909) (0.0879) (0.0696) (0.0708)
Year 2013 −0.0340 −0.0358 0.0277 0.0324
(0.0813) (0.0862) (0.0767) (0.0922)
Socio-economic variables No Yes No Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.089 0.193 0.186 0.293
N 337 324 333 314
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Unfair taxes Unfair taxes Unfair sort Unfair sort
PGB −0.188* −0.286*** −0.271*** −0.358***
(0.102) (0.0957) (0.0919) (0.0917)
Year 2013 −0.0590 −0.0031 0.0576 0.132
(0.0761) (0.0907) (0.0763) (0.0904)
Socio-economic variables No Yes No Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.163 0.312 0.104 0.198
N 326 311 355 342
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Unfair ineq. Unfair ineq. Leg. cush. Leg. cush.
PGB −0.0190 −0.0411 −0.0961 −0.0269
(0.117) (0.0941) (0.102) (0.121)
Year 2013 −0.229*** −0.166*** 0.317*** 0.321***
(0.0675) (0.0678) (0.0631) (0.0734)
Socio-economic variables No Yes No Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.167 0.259 0.127 0.218
N 249 236 374 356
Note: Estimates report marginal eﬀects (all discrete changes). Brute force ﬁxed eﬀects.
Individuals bypassed if Y ict always =0 or always =1 (ﬁxed eﬀects cannot be computed).
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses (cluster per municipality).
* p<0.1.
** p<0.05.
*** p<0.01.
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